THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
reserve" or "the prevention of premature and inopportune anticipation of the kingdom of God" is, Segundo says, simply the result of a confusion of values by way of absolutizing the eschatological order at the expense of the political. 10 To that extent, their political theology is no different from other types of theology which have absolutized Church ritual and dogma, while relativizing the Church's "historical functionality," or, in other words, the work of liberation.
11 According to Segundo, this amounts to an inversion of the "evangelical order of values."
12 Jesus himself, he argues, did not hesitate to absolutize the historical present by opting against, if not the Roman Empire, the prevailing Judaic theocracy.
13
Against the Pharisees, who were always looking for salvation in "signs from heaven," Jesus, following the example of the Old Testament prophets and listening more to his heart than to cold reason, recognized "the arrival of God's kingdom" in the concrete liberation of the deaf, the lame, the sick, and the poor.
14 To be consistent with Jesus' own example, therefore, Segundo concludes, theologians must avoid any kind of "academicism which posits ideological neutrality as the ultimate criterion."
15
They cannot remain detached and "fly along a middle course equally above the political right and left." 16 They must be prepared to take sides. A choice will have to be made between, e.g., socialism and capitalism.
17
Here Segundo's position obviously becomes more complex and controversial, hinging as it does on the difficult task of determining whether the ideology in question actually embodies evangelical values or not, or, in other words, whether it is good or bad 18 either in itself or concretely.
in den Vereinigten Staaten," Korrespondenzblatt des Canisianums 1 [1986] 2-5), to the extent that, although they try to put Christianity on the side of capitalism, they do at least take a stand. 10 Segundo, "Capitalism-Socialism" 12, 13. 78), suggesting that "the notion of good and evil concerns the person," while "rightwrong refers to one's conduct." I would agree that the distinction between the two moral categories is important, but would suggest that it could better be drawn in terms of what is of value (good-evil) and what is "in line" with the valuable (right-wrong), and that if it is, the association of the pairs with the "person" and the "person's conduct" will not be nearly so neat as Fuchs and McCormick seem to think. An act of friendship, e.g., might certainly 7 Traditionally, Christian thinkers have been inclined to classify something as good or bad in itself on the basis of the extent to which it does or does not accord with what is reasonable under the light of revelation. 19 Actions like theft and lying, e.g., were said to be so intrinsically contrary to divine command and right reason that they could never become good in the concrete, no matter what intention one might have in their regard, or what the consequences of the action might be. 20 According to such a traditional line of thought, one or another ideology, like Nazism, might be said to be bad in itself, to the extent that the thoughts and actions it brings into play are by their very nature contrary to divine positive and natural law. Even if the goals of Nazism had been good (which they were not), it could still have been condemned in and of itself, on the grounds that no end, however noble, could ever justify the kind of violent means it employed against innocent people.
Not all contemporary theologians, however, seem to subscribe to this traditional line of thought about intrinsic morality. And according to Cardinal Ratzinger at least, Segundo is in their number. Some proponents be analyzed morally from the viewpoint of its value as an intermediary goal, and at the same time be judged to be right or wrong to the extent that it serves as a means to some higher end, or greater good, as, e.g., the building up of community. In any event, I will generally limit my discussion here to the category of good-evil, cognizant all the while that not infrequently the category of right-wrong might also apply, especially since by Segundo's reckoning ideologies are principally concerned with means, not ends.
19 When, as during New Testament times or the period of the Protestant Reformation, divine positive law received more attention that natural law, intrinsic good and evil often came to be defined simply as that which has been "commanded" or "prohibited" by Scripture, although never to the total neglect of the philosophical terminology which had been inherited from Stoicism (See Verkamp, Indifferent Mean 21-25 It is significant that those things which medieval theologians from Augustine to Aquinas called bona or mala ex objecto or ex officio could still be classified as things indifferent in se in the sense that, like the Stoic "preferred" or "rejected" adiaphora, they were considered capable of becoming good or bad in the concrete. The thing indifferent was precisely "id quod potest bene vel male fieri," and something was thought to be intrinsically good or evil to the extent that it lacked such flexibility (see Verkamp, Indifferent Mean 22-23). is precisely what earlier theologians were doing when they defined certain actions as being morally wrong ex objecto, namely, including in the object of the action not simply the materia circa quam but also elements beyond it which clearly exclude any possible justification of the action-e.g., defining murder as the killing of an innocent person ("Notes," TS 43 [1982] 85-86). Far from teaching anything novel, therefore, McCormick claims that the proportionalists are only trying to extend the same approach to actions like contraception, sterilization, masturbation, etc., which traditionally have been exempted from teleological assessment (ibid.). 26 The whole debate over proportionalism suffers, I think, from a failure to distinguish adequately between abstract and concrete morality, and Segundo is guilty in this regard too, with the result that it is often difficult to tell which he is talking about. He comes closest to the proportionalist position when saying, e.g., that the "intended project" is the "sole criterion for spelling out what is good in itself" {Faith and Ideologies 44). But it would be hard to reconcile a proportionalist interpretation of such a remark with the remainder of his thought, which seems to reject the possibility of an action being intrinsically good or evil.
ON DOING THE TRUTH 9 direction of situationalism, one of whose basic tenets has always been the conclusion that the end, and only the end, justifies the means.
27
It is a "critical and decisive fact," Segundo has stated, that "our freedom, which consists precisely in our capacity to make absolutes, is triggered and starts to operate precisely insofar as the absolute is not inscribed in the things and events that we come across in reality." 28 
Segundo adds in this regard that he is not disturbed by the possibility that such a line of thought might "turn stealing or killing into licit actions" (ibid. 173). See also his remarks concerning adultery {Faith and Ideologies 45).
36 It is worth noting here that Segundo does not, therefore, accept as exclusively definitive the "negative" Marxist understanding of ideology as the sum of cognitive mechanisms which disguise, excuse, and even sacralize the existing modes of production so as to benefit those who profit from that mode of production (ibid. 96-97). He admits that ideologies can be perverted in such wise, and occasionally accuses religions of being used in this way (ibid. 123), but does not see this perversion as being essential to the definition of ideology. Whether there is any room in Marxism for an understanding of ideology as being neutral in itself is another question, to which Segundo gives a weak affirmative on the grounds that Marx did sometimes use the word to refer to "everything that lies outside the precision of the sciences, to the suprascientific or the superstructural realm" (ibid. 96, 97). Gutiérrez, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES themselves." 37 They can be judged to be good or bad only by "higher criteria that are valid in themselves." 38 The sole criterion of such sort, Segundo notes, is "the intended project of a human being toward his or her fellow humans," 39 or, in other words, by "love" 40 or by "what the heart bids a person to do in the face of the needs of his or her fellow humans."
41 Such an "intended project" is the "only criterion for spelling out what is good in itself."
42 It alone can give the ideology a "moral dimension."
43 Segundo does at one point suggest that "not all ideologies are equally neutral," 44 and one might think that he has in mind to introduce thereby something akin to the Stoic distinction between "preferred" and "rejected" adiaphora, 45 especially in view of his emphasis elsewhere upon an "analogy between the means and the ends."
46 But what he really means is that not every ideology is "equally efficacious," 47 and that in trying to decide which ideology is the right means, one must therefore consider the "objective laws which ensure efficacy."
48 This is not a matter of deciding whether the means are intrinsically good or bad, but of "comparing the means with the end" and "deciding whether they are in harmony or not."
49 That one would conclude, e.g., that terrorist activity was not as "neutral" as, say, nonviolent civil disobedience, would not imply for Segundo that the former was in and of itself more evil than it may be noted, uses the term "ideology" almost exclusively in the negative Marxist sense, namely, as designating a process of "rationalizing and justifying a given social and ecclesial order" {Theology of Liberation 12, 234-35, 249 nn. 118, 119, 120, 121).
37 Faith and Ideologies 42. Segundo's discussion in this passage, it should be noted, is about "religion." But as he understands it, religion, as distinguished from faith, belongs entirely to the "instrumental, functional" (i.e., ideological) level, so that what he says about religion generally pertains also to all ideologies, and vice versa (ibid. 41-44 45 Against the Cynics, who because of their extreme emphasis upon self-sufficiency had designated all external actions absolutely devoid of value or disvalue, the Stoics argued that even though the interior disposition of "right reason" is supreme, and all externals are on that account indifferent by nature, some adiaphora are more or less in accord with right reason and to that extent are to be "preferred" or "rejected," or, in regard to actions, considered "appropriate" or "inappropriate" (Verkamp, Indifferent Mean 121). the latter, but only that such terrorism is contextually (i.e., historically) counterproductive to the achievement of one's "intended project." 50 So long as any action is "efficacious," it might qualify as a suitable means.
51
Segundo admits that there is a danger here of "establishing means which have no likeness to the ends," but this is a risk, he says, which must sometimes be taken, and "the only means to the goal will [be] the one which is least analogous to the goal itself." 52 One could argue, therefore, that Segundo does not perhaps adequately allow for the possibility of intrinsically evil ideologies, and that the choice between conflicting ideologies is not, as he seems to think, always a matter of merely judging their respective goals or practicality. So far as the great majority of particular ideologies are concerned, however, such criticism might be of little relevance, in that few traditionally-minded theologians would argue that most ideologies are actually in and of themselves so evil that they are beyond conversion to the good in the concrete. For them, no less than for Segundo, therefore, the question of making a moral choice between one or another particular ideology would also come down, more often than not, to a matter of deciding whether the ideology in question was good or bad in the concrete by virtue of the intentions of those implementing it, or in view of its actual consequences. 53 One would have to determine, in other words, whether the ideology is actually projected toward, and efficaciously instrumental in, the "concrete transformation of peoples' lives" (as Segundo puts it), 54 or, as the apostle Paul was wont to ask, whether it is "edifying" in its direction and consequences. 55 Socialism, e.g., could be judged to be concretely good if the transferrai of ownership of the means of production from individuals to higher institutions whose concern is the common good 56 were done with the intention of liberating the masses from economic alienation, and actually resulted in some greater degree of 60 Ibid. 258; Liberation of Theology 172-73. 51 The Syllogismus practicus Segundo has in mind here is clearly different from the "Marxist prophet's" emphasis upon "uninterrupted success," against which Albert Camus protested so vehemently {The Rebel [New York: Random House, 1956] 242).
62 Faith and Ideologies 268. As an example, Segundo cites the case of someone having "to fight against those whose interests are opposed to the establishment of peace" (ibid.). 53 Traditionally, most theologians have been inclined to conclude that to the extent that an action is genuinely human, i.e. free and deliberate, it is either good or bad in the concrete, and cannot qualify as being indifferent. Peter Martyr gave the classic expression of this position: "As touching these things that be indifferent, we must affirme, that onelie (according to their owne kind and nature) they have this indifférencié. But when we come unto election, there is nothing indifferent: for it is of necessitie that the same be either good or evil" {Commonplaces 2:164,165, as cited in Verkamp, Indifferent Mean 117 62 To be sure, the possibility of erring may simply be, as Segundo has implied, 63 part of the risk one must take in the process of trying to put one's faith to work, and does not in itself undermine the need for partiality in cases where an ideology is judged to be good or bad. Still, is it not conceivable that on occasion such clarity of judgment will not be possible, and when it is not, might the theologian not do better to remain neutral? Consider, e.g., the case of Desiderius Erasmus in the 16th century. account. 70 By hindsight, however, his neutrality might seem to have been a wise move. Had more 16th-century Christian theologian^ of a similar mind-set followed his example, it is conceivable that much of the subsequent warfare between various factions in the Christian community could have been avoided, and far more attention could have been given by the same community to the practice of charity, in which, according to Erasmus, the sum of religion consisted. 71 For all that Erasmus could tell, neither the Roman Church nor the Protestant Churches showed any infallible signs of being exclusively the true religion. If any group did impress him in this regard, it was probably the Anabaptists, who were persecuted viciously by both the Roman Catholics and the Protestants of the 16th century.
72 But their sometimes fanatical bouts of iconoclasm and communitarian experiments also frightened Erasmus.
73 So he remained neutral, challenging all sides thereby to practice more effectively what they preached.
Might not a similar neutrality be justified in the face of the present choice between capitalism and socialism? Having written that "historical sensibility to hunger and illiteracy calls for a society where competition and profit will not be the law and where the provision of basic food and culture to an underdeveloped people will be regarded as liberation," 74 Segundo himself obviously thinks the choice between capitalism and socialism clear enough for Christian theologians living today, and finds it hard to understand how they can remain impartial. But if indeed the "projected intention" of love and the "concrete transformation of peoples' lives" are to be the sole criteria of God's provident presence, then surely, even while respecting the concrete choices made by Segundo and other liberation theologians, one could still doubt honestly about which economic system is on God's side and, until the evidence is clearer about which system is actually delivering the goods to the people, either refrain from taking sides altogether or embrace a two-game approach such as that advocated by MIT economist Lester C. Thurow, which tries to tap both ideologies for what they have to offer. Whether to choose sides, however, is still only half the question about orthopraxis. Even if the theologian has decided on the value of one or another ideology, there will still be the question about how involved he or she ought to become in supporting or fighting the ideology that is perceived to be either good or bad. The liberation theologians seem to think that quite a lot of involvement is necessary.
The "politicizing function" of the gospel, whereby the conscience of oppressed peoples is brought alive by their hearing of the "good news," will occur, Gutiérrez claims, when the gospel is lived and announced "from within a commitment to liberation, only in concrete, effective solidarity with people, and exploited social classes." 76 "Only by participating in their struggles," he adds, "can we understand the implications of the Gospel message and make it have an impact on history." 77 Theology, according to Segundo, "cannot begin with certitudes deduced from revelation"; 78 it is rather a "second step." 79 It should come, Gutiérrez says, only after engagement, in the same way that Hegel said that philosophy should "rise only at sundown." 80 It must be based upon a reading of the "signs of the times," which include not only "a call to himself has expressed skepticism about the viability of "third-way alternatives," on the grounds that all such attempts in Latin America (e.g., Peronism) fell prey "to an ironclad system which they were unwilling or unable to replace" {Faith and Ideologies 279). Another option might be to conclude, with Raymond Aron, that in the face of the modern progressoriented industrial Western civilization, which inevitably introduces impersonality into human labor, all ideologies are dead, and the opposition between socialism and capitalism is irrelevant, because both, in an industrial society, will ultimately force human beings to continue selling their labor as an impersonal commodity (ibid. 253-56). Segundo admits that Axon's thesis can shed some new light on this whole problem-complex, but argues also that more often than not it is used "by conservative factions to relativize the choice between capitalism and socialism," especially when voiced in underdeveloped countries "which are nowhere near the take-off point for large-scale industrialism" (ibid. 256, 257). 80 Theology of Liberation 11. Presumably, unless it is to be purely aesthetical or contemplative, this "reflection after sundown" would be done with an eye toward the next day's activity, and in that sense at least would still imply some priority of theory over praxis. In the more severe view of Segundo, however, it comes to mean that "not ... a single dogma can be studied under any other final criterion than that of its social impact on the praxis." 84 Secondly, practicing theology "from within a commitment to liberation" would seem to mean for the liberation theologians the willingness and readiness to take the risk of putting one's body on the front line of the struggle for liberation. Segundo says that he can much better understand "those who refuse to do theology or to have anything to do with it, because they feel it has no meaning or value for the liberation process," than he can understand "those who practice it as an academic discipline in the security of some chamber immune to the risks of the liberation struggle." 85 Seminaries and universities have accustomed us, he says, to "the idea of considering theology as an academic discipline, as a degree program in the liberal arts." 86 But the "historical fact is," he continues, "that once upon a time, theologizing was a very different sort of activity, a dangerous one in fact. It certainly was not a 'liberal art' for men like the prophets and Jesus. They died before their time because of their theologizing, because of their specific way of interpreting the word of God and its implications for the liberation of the oppressed." 87 "Only academic theologians can talk about the 'death of God,' " Segundo con- sition of love, whether its object is speculative or practical, 98 and whether its goal is contemplative or activist. As such, it is as relative and flexible in itself as any other external activity, and can be judged to be good or bad in the final analysis only by the contribution it does or does not make to the process of liberation or "edification." What kind of theolog ical activity will be genuinely constructive, therefore, cannot be deter mined beforehand in the abstract." Rather, each theologian will have to discern existentially, 100 and in accordance with an honest appraisal of personal talents, what external form his or her pursuit of theology should take. Not every theologian will find in himself or herself the stomach, the stamina, the discipline, or the frame of mind necessary for one or another approach to theology. An honest appraisal of one's own self might also reveal that no one individual theologian can possibly satisfy all the needs of humankind in this regard. The notion of a Renaissance man was an intriguing conceit of an earlier rationalistic age, but it would seem to have little foundation in Christian morality. The assumption of the latter would seem rather to be that no one individual can, or need try to, do everything. Why? Mainly because, according to the apostle Paul at least, one is never alone in the project of doing the truth, but belongs to a community of believers each of whom, according to his or her own gifts, shares in the division of labor (1 Cor 12). Precisely because they belong to a church, therefore, theologians, it would seem according to Pauline doctrine, can enjoy a sense of shared creativity and responsi bility. One theologian can carry his or her end of the burden, however removed and risk-free it might be or seem, without feeling intimidated by lack of time or talent for political engagement or for the writing of more timely tracts. Even while cheering on and supporting those theo logians on the front line, he or she can get on with his or her own work, knowing that all are in the work of liberation together, and that it is only when all work together than the job will ever get done. The example set by three Christian theologians living in Germany and Austria during the late 1930s and early 1940s, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Josef Jungmann, and Karl Rahner, may serve to illustrate the point I am trying to make.
Early on, in 1933 already, Bonhoeffer had sided with the so-called "confessing Church" that was being championed by those German Prot estants who wanted to maintain the independence of the church over against Nazi domination. 
